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n May 2011 we argued for a modest advance in Russian democracy, namely that both 
Medvedev and Putin should stand as candidates to offer a modicum of choice between, 
roughly speaking, modernisation versus continuity.1 For Putin to stand alone would be 
disrespectful towards the Russian people. And so it comes to pass for the 4th of March.  The 
two leaders decided that just Putin should stand, and so many people are deeply offended, 
expressing this through very peaceful street demonstrations led by the new middle classes 
(for some a ‘mink-coat revolution’), and above all through modern social network 
communications.    
The de facto manifesto of the new opposition is being laid out in a series of interviews posted 
on the internet between Boris Akunin, a fiction writer and democratic activist, and Aleksey 
Navalny, a lawyer who made his name initially as an anti-corruption fighter. Navalny is the 
leader, a highly articulate and charismatic speaker. Here is the authentic language of the 
contest. Navalny argues: 
The ‘Let’s Screw Putin’ movement – that’s our main task, all the rest is a waste of 
resources – needs to reduce his rating to 30% around the country and 15-25% in the 
larger cities and so destroy his real support base. It’s a completely achievable aim, 
given even the official election results for United Russia in the big cities. We have the 
mechanisms to do this, and the activists as well – we have 100,000 out there, we just 
n e e d  t o  s o r t  o u t  o u r  c a m p a i g n i n g  i n f r a s t r ucture and come up with creative and 
persuasive ways to get our message across 
The main thing is that we don’t have to lie to people. We can get through to them 
simply by telling them the plain facts about Putin, his billionaire friends, FSB 
generals whose children suddenly all turned up working for state banks. The slogan 
‘United Russia is the Party of Crooks and Thieves’ has stuck not thanks to some kind 
of technology, but because it’s the truth…  
Those 100,000 people are both a campaign headquarters, and a perfect propaganda 
machine, capable of spreading necessary information to scores of millions of their 
fellow-citizens in a very short time. Every member of this many-thousand Machine 
needs to talk to ten people they know, send emails, put information on social 
networks. That’s all we need. 2   
                                                      
1 “An Elegant Solution to the Medvedev-Putin Problem”, CEPS Commentary, May 2011. 
2 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/63649 
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Putin for his part was evidently knocked off balance by this movement. He booted his main 
‘political technologist’, Vladislav Surkov, out of the Kremlin while refusing an invitation to a 
TV debate with other candidates. His spokesman said he was too busy. 
Then Putin countered with a lengthy article in Izvestia on January 16th, with arguments about 
the merits of political stability and his own achievements in rescuing Russia from the chaos 
of the Yeltsin period:  
In today’s world stability is an asset that can only be earned by hard work and with 
openness to change and readiness for imminent, deliberate and calculated reform. 
The recurring problem in Russia’s history is the aspiration of the elites for a leap, a 
revolution instead of gradual developments. Russia’s experience – as well as the 
experience of the entire world – shows the destructiveness of historical leaps, of 
overthrowing in haste without creating.  
About the hazards of revolution he has a point. He concluded his article with: 
And here I would like again to say why I have agreed to run for the post of President 
of Russia in 2012. I do not want, and will not, belittle anyone’s achievements in 
establishing our new country. There were many. But the facts remain that in 1999, 
when I became prime minister and later President, our country was in a deep and 
systemic crisis. And it is a group of like-minded people – which the author of these 
l i n e s  w a s  t o  f o r m  a n d  l e a d ,  s u p p o r t e d  b y  a n  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  o f  c i t i z e n s  a n d  
national unity around common goals – which led Russia out of the impasse of Civil 
War, which broke the back of terrorism, restored territorial integrity and 
constitutional order, which revived the economy, and ensured during ten years that 
Russia had one of the world’s highest economic growth rates as well as rising 
incomes. 
Navalny will not however be a candidate for President, since he has not had the time to 
organise the 2 million signatures required. On the other hand, Mikhail Prokhorov, Russia’s 
richest oligarch, seems able to do so, with many hired hands collecting signatures in 
shopping districts and metro stations. At first sight, the youthful and imposing (2 metres tall) 
figure of Prokhorov might be seen as standing for modernity and change. But in reality he is 
just a Kremlin stooge, supplying a front for those wishing to say there is political 
competition, whereas he has no chance of success. In mid-January he shared a TV duel with 
Gennady Zyuganov, the veteran leader of the Communist Party. Prokhorov’s political 
debating skills were dismal, even compared to the worn out, long-playing gramophone 
record of Zyuganov.    
Putin’s second major contribution to public debate came in a lengthy article in Nezavisamaya 
Gazeta on 23 January, entirely devoted to the issue of ethnicity and multiculturalism. Putin’s 
argument is that while unnamed European politicians (obviously Merkel and Sarkozy 
amongst others) have been playing the ethnic card to stay in office with the message of 
‘failed multiculturalism’, Russia will by contrast “strengthen the historical state that we 
inherited from our ancestors, the civilisation that is blessed with an inherent ability to 
integrate various ethnicities and faiths”. Leaving aside the dubious receptivity of this speech 
in today’s Northern Caucasus, its main target seems to be the extreme ‘Russia for Russians’ 
nationalist factions in the country’s heartland, noticing also the uneasy cohabitation between 
nationalist and liberal-democratic elements among Navalny’s demonstrators.   
This is all about domestic politics. The main foreign policy proposition so far was presented 
by Putin in an article in Izvestia on 4 October 2011, where he launched the idea of a Eurasian 
Union. This would renew the integration of as many as possible states of the former USSR, 
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communist command and control have obviously gone for ever. Well yes, obviously. But still 
the meetings of heads of state of these former Soviet republics are not a happy sight. 
Lukashenko and Karimov are dictators of international pariah status, with Aliev catching up 
quickly. Yanukovich reverts increasingly to Putin-style authoritarianism, and there are no 
recognisable democratic leaders among the rest. Putin resumes Russia’s geo-political 
pressuring of Ukraine through gas pipeline geo-politics, announcing agreement with Turkey 
to go ahead with a hugely expensive South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea, which only 
makes sense as a bluff to threaten Ukraine with loss of gas transit income. He is pressuring 
Ukraine into joining the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which would 
mean dropping Ukraine’s free trade agreement with the EU that is awaiting signature.  
A second manifestation of current Russian foreign policy is its stance over Syria. This has 
been symbolised by the recent visit to Russia’s Syrian naval base of its only aircraft carrier, 
Admiral Kuznetsov. Russian TV portrayed it as a demonstration of solidarity with the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad in the face of Western pressures. The Syrian defence minister 
visited the ship, appreciating the show of solidarity. This crude geo-political posturing may 
have been intended to help Putin’s re-election, but it also portrays the most bizarre 
international image at a time when the Arab League wants to get rid of Assad. At the level of 
foreign policy norms, Russia is standing the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
on its head, to protect not the people but repressive authoritarian regimes. As damage 
limitation diplomacy, its latest move is to volunteer to mediate directly between the Syrian 
authorities and opposition, which the latter rejects.  
What would Mr Navalny have to say on Russian foreign policy? Boris Akunin tackled him 
about this indirectly, “The main reason for [my] mistrust is your allegiance to Russian 
nationalism... Are you sorry that the USSR is no longer in existence?”  
Navalny replies: 
Everybody wants their country to be bigger, richer, stronger. That’s perfectly normal, 
and it’s what I want as well. .... The USSR was destroyed not by external forces, but 
by the Communist Party, the State Planning Committee and the Soviet political elite. 
... That is historical fact. Another fact is that the core and foundation of the Russian 
empire and the USSR was our country – Russia. And Russia remains, both 
economically and militarily, the dominant state of the region. Our task is to preserve 
and build on that. ... We should not deliberately be making plans for any expansion; 
our task is to become strong and rich ourselves, and then our neighbours will be part 
of our zone of influence; they won’t have any option. 
 But beyond this, Navalny has shown no real interest in foreign affairs.    
And what should the EU be saying about all this, bearing in mind its declared objective of 
democracy promotion in the world at large? EU policy towards Russia in this context is easy 
to define and execute perfectly. Do nothing. Just leave the Russians to make up their own 
minds. Putin is already trying to rally all loyal Russians to his support by decrying foreign 
plots. Michael McFaul, a respected democracy promotion academic before joining the 
Obama team in Washington, and now the new US ambassador in Moscow, already fits the 
plot perfectly. No need to add to it. The virus of demands for clean democracy seems to 
develop quite strongly all by itself, with the demonstration planned for 4 February aiming at 
getting 100,000 people together on the streets of Moscow. With this Putin cannot compete. 
His attempted counter-demonstration last week in Ekaterinburg flopped, even with busloads 
of people from nearby towns reportedly bribed with organised visits to IKEA and Metro 
shopping malls on the way back.  4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Still Putin’s re-election seems a safe bet, given that the other candidates are either unable to 
stand (Yavlinsky and Navalny), or are just ageing court jesters (Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky), 
or are Kremlin stooges (Prokhorov). However the credibility and legitimacy of Putin’s 
leadership have been damaged for his return to power; just how seriously remains to be 
seen. The idea of his return for two terms has been erased for sure. In the meantime the task 
is to ensure that the new momentum of ideas and people takes on a real political shape, 
which is not yet the case, but this will require years – not weeks or months.  